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DEBATING WAR AND PEACE IN LATE
ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND*
ALEXANDRA GA JDA
University of Birmingham
A B S T R ACT. Peace with Spain was debated by Elizabeth I’s government from 1598, when France and
Spain made peace by signing the Treaty of Vervins. Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex was zealously
hostile to accommodation with Spain, while other privy councillors argued in favour of peace. Arguments for
and against peace were, however, also articulated in wider contexts, in particular in a series of manuscript
treatises, and also in printed tracts from the Netherlands, which appeared in English translation in the late
1590s. This article explores ways that ideas of war and peace were disseminated in manuscript and printed
media outside the privy council and court. It is argued that disagreement about the direction of the war reveals
diﬀering contemporary responses to the legitimacy of the Dutch abjuration of Spanish sovereignty and the
polity of the United Provinces, which have implications for our understanding of political mentalities in late
Elizabethan England.
‘ I found the state embarked in a great and tedious war … by the peace in my
person is now amity kept. ’1 To his ﬁrst English parliament in 1604, James VI and
I deﬁned himself as God’s instrument of peace and regeneration. War, above all,
had shaped the dynamics of Elizabeth’s so-called ‘ second reign’. The economic
burdens of conﬂict with Spain, exacerbated by harsh environmental conditions
and the rebellion of Hugh O’Neill, earl of Tyrone in Ireland, top a long list of
reasons that have caused historians to regard the 1590s as a decade of unusual
hardship, and to explain a broader sense, reﬂected in the political and literary
culture, of weariness with the old queen’s rule.2
The Jacobean peace, though, had longer roots in the ﬁnal years of Elizabeth’s
reign.3 English attacks on the Spanish mainland and ﬂeets in the 1590s had little
lasting impact on the direction of the war, and by the latter part of the decade
Elizabeth began to view the restoration of authority in Ireland as the most urgent
Department of History, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, B15 2TT a.m.gajda@bham.ac.uk
* Versions of this article have been read at seminars at the Tudor and Stuart seminar at the
Institute of Historical Research, the University of St Andrews, and the University of Birmingham. All
pre-1800 works were published in London unless otherwise stated.
1 James VI and I, The political works of James I, ed. Charles McIlwain (New York, NY, 1965), p. 270.
2 John Guy, ‘The 1590s: the second reign of Elizabeth I? ’, in John Guy, ed., The reign of Elizabeth I :
court and culture in the last decade (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 1–19.
3 Pauline Croft, ‘Brussels and London: the archdukes, Robert Cecil and James I’, in Werner
Thomas and Luc Duerloo, eds., Albert and Isabella, 1598–1621: Essays (Brepols, 1998), pp. 79–86.
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priority of her government. The serious possibility of peace with Spain was de-
bated when England and the United Provinces were invited to participate in
negotiations that surrounded the Treaty of Vervins, made public on 22 April
(2 May NS), which brought a formal end to Franco-Spanish hostilities.
Thereafter, Anglo-Spanish relations have been described as a gradual ‘ shuﬄing
towards peace’, realized in 1604.4
There was, however, no inevitable trajectory towards the Treaty of London,
and Elizabethans expressed varied and complex attitudes towards the war with
Spain in the late 1590s. Most famously, vociferous hostility to peace was expressed
by Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex, whose treatise, To Maister Anthony
Bacon : an apologie of the earle of Essex against those which falsly and maliciously taxe him to be
the onely hinderer of the peace, and quiet of his countrey (1600), stridently argued that a
settlement with Spain would bring disaster to England and Christendom.5 The
earl’s ideological hostility to peace caused a permanent breakdown in his uneasy
relations with William and Robert Cecil, who were more strongly inclined to seek
an end to England’s military commitment on the continent, and energized the
nascent factions at court.6 Disagreements between Essex and the Cecils were,
however, representative of a wider and more vigorous debate about foreign policy
in the late 1590s.
Essex’s Apologie was itself a ‘ semi-public ’ document, which initially circulated in
manuscript soon after its composition in the late spring or early summer of 1598.7
Historians have not hitherto realized that the Apologie was originally one of a series
of similar treatises about the peace, written around the time of the Treaty of
Vervins. Almost all were anonymous, but appear to have been written by ﬁgures
connected to the court, and received limited scribal circulation. Some concurred
with Essex’s views on the war, but others argued in favour of peace with equal
vehemence.
Important elements of this critical debate about peace with Spain were also
disseminated in print. The only direct discussion of the deliberations in court and
council to appear in a printed text was Essex’s Apologie, published in an un-
authorized version in 1600. In this article, it will be shown that a rash of propa-
ganda from the United Provinces, published in English translation in the late
1590s, also provided Elizabethan readers with a commentary on Spain’s relations
with the Netherlands and the Protestant Dutch, which had foreboding implica-
tions for England’s involvement in peace negotiations. Through the indirect
medium of foreign news pamphlets, an even wider audience of Elizabethan
readers gained access to the critical substance of debates about foreign policy, the
4 W. T. MacCaﬀrey, Elizabeth I : war and politics, 1588–1603 (New Haven, CT, 1992), pp. 220–45.
5 This unauthorized edition was published in 1600; a further edition was printed in 1603.
6 P. E. J. Hammer, ‘Patronage at court, faction and the earl of Essex’, in Guy, ed., Reign of
Elizabeth I, pp. 65–86.
7 P. E. J. Hammer, ‘The smiling crocodile: the earl of Essex and late-Elizabethan ‘‘popularity ’’ ’,
in Peter Lake and Steven Pincus, eds., The politics of the public sphere in early modern England (Manchester,
2007), pp. 95–115, at p. 86.
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essential arcana imperii, the most traditional prerogative of princes. Analysis of
manuscript treatises and translations of foreign news pamphlets reveals that the
ideas used to express and explore the desirability of peace, and the written media
in which they were conducted, deepen our understanding of late Elizabethan
political culture in signiﬁcant ways.
Contemporary arguments about war and peace demonstrate the ways that
foreign policy shaped Elizabethan political thinking, and the articulation of
political ideas. Formal and informal state and self-censorship meant that
Elizabethans often wrote about political ideas implicitly, or covertly ; in drama,
literature, or historical writing.8 In the 1590s, it has been argued, the Elizabethan
regime became especially concerned to denounce theories that legitimized re-
sistance to princely rule, which found potent expression in the writings of English
Jesuits, or were associated with the ‘Dangerous Positions ’ of radical Puritanism.
The political rhetoric of the Elizabethan elites grew more authoritarian in tone
in response to the acute economic hardships of the decade, which caused
widespread fear of social disorder and popular revolt.9 Debates about foreign
policy, however, engaged Elizabethans in wider discourses about concepts of
monarchy and tyranny, liberty and slavery, resistance and obedience, interest and
policy : ideas being central to ideological debates about the state in sixteenth-
century Europe, that were rarely explored in explicit relation to domestic politics.
In particular, deliberations about the future of the alliance with the United
Provinces reveal the ideological conundrum posed by Elizabeth’s foreign policy.
Famously, Elizabeth rejected the formal sovereignty of the Netherlands : the
oﬃcial published justiﬁcation for Elizabeth’s intervention in the Dutch revolt
stressed that the queen had laboured to prevent the rebel provinces from casting
oﬀ their allegiance to their prince, and that the martial aid oﬀered the rebel states
was defensive, intended to restore the Low Countries’ ‘ancient liberties ’ and
constitution as had existed in the reign of Charles V. The same pamphlet, how-
ever, also admitted that the ‘ancient lawes ’ of the Netherlands permitted the
Dutch, in defence of their liberties, to transfer their allegiance to a diﬀerent
ruler.10 By signing the Treaty of Nonsuch in 1585, Elizabeth treated with the
United Provinces as a sovereign power, implicitly recognizing their abjuration of
Philip II’s authority as legitimate, and acknowledging the de facto transformation
8 See for example, Annabel Patterson, Censorship and interpretation : the conditions of writing and reading in
early modern England (Madison, WI, 1984) ; Marie Axton, The queen’s two bodies : drama and the Elizabethan
succession (London, 1977). For the sporadic nature of the enforcement of censorship, see Cyndia Susan
Clegg, Press censorship in Elizabethan England (Cambridge, 1997).
9 John Guy, ‘The Elizabethan establishment and the ecclesiastical polity ’, in Guy, ed., Reign of
Elizabeth I, pp. 126–49; A. N. McLaren, Political culture in the reign of Elizabeth I : queen and commonwealth,
1558–1585 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 9–10, 195–7; J. Sharpe, ‘Social strain and social dislocation’, in Guy,
ed., Reign of Elizabeth I, pp. 192–211. Richard Bancroft is the assumed author of Daungerous positions and
proceedings, published and practiced … for the presbiteriall discipline (1593).
10 A declaration of the causes mooving the queene of England to giue aide to the defence of the people aﬄicted and
oppressed in the lowe countries (1585), p. 8 and passim.
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of the polity, from a monarchical state to a republic of federated provinces,
governed by the States General of the North. Although historians of Elizabethan
foreign policy have acknowledged the importance of the ideological dilemma
faced by Elizabeth in her decision to support the Dutch, most studies of
Elizabethan political thought have not hitherto paid adequate attention to the
ways that the Dutch revolt or the government of the United Provinces was con-
ceptualized.11 The texts that debated the future of the war in the 1590s reveal that
contemporaries held distinctly diﬀerent attitudes to the legitimacy of the polity
of the United Provinces, which are indicative of deeper variance in political
mentalities.
There has been intense recent engagement in the historiography of early
modern England with the character of ‘popular politics ’, ‘news culture ’, and the
development of a ‘public sphere ’, which engaged Englishmen and women in
critical discourse with the state that governed them.12 Peter Lake and Steven
Pincus have argued that, while such a sphere did exist in pre-Civil War England,
it was energized sporadically, and by a clutch of acute topical concerns that
galvanized ‘public opinion’.13 The war with Spain touched the lives of Elizabeth’s
subjects as profoundly as any other concern of the commonwealth, as it aﬀected
that potent brew: the material and spiritual welfare of nation and subjects.
Moreover, a ‘reading public ’ in Elizabethan England had easier access to printed
information about continental news than about domestic politics.14 Scholars have
long recognized the signiﬁcance of the popular response to foreign policy in the
1620s – particularly in reaction to the Spanish match – but the Elizabethan roots
of public engagement with foreign policy demand further attention. A study of
translations of Dutch news materials from the late 1590s oﬀers some preliminary
observations towards such an investigation, by demonstrating the nexus which
connected the political debate of the court and privy council to the public read-
ership of print. Analysis of texts reﬂecting on the peace also demonstrates that the
substance of politics was diﬀerently aired in manuscript and printed texts, which
also has ramiﬁcations for our understanding of the complexity of the burgeoning
news culture, and the late Elizabethan ‘public sphere ’.
11 For important treatments of the ideological ramiﬁcations of Elizabeth’s decision to support the
Dutch in 1585 see especially S. L. Adams, ‘The Protestant cause: religious alliance with the European
Calvinist communities as a political issue in England, 1585–1630’ (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1973), pp.
24–42 and passim; idem, ‘Elizabeth I and the sovereignty of the Netherlands 1576–1585’, Transactions of
the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., 14 (2004), pp. 309–19; R. B. Wernham, ‘England and the revolt of
the Netherlands’, in J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann, eds., Britain and the Netherlands (London, 1960),
pp. 29–40.
12 Recent works include Lake and Pincus, eds., Public sphere ; Joad Raymond, Pamphlets and pamph-
leteering in early modern Britain (Cambridge, 2003) ; Natalie Mears, Queenship and political discourse in the
Elizabethan realms (Cambridge, 2006).
13 ‘ Introduction: Rethinking the public sphere in early modern England’, in Lake and Pincus, eds.,
Public sphere, pp. 1–30. 14 Raymond, Pamphlets and pamphleteering, pp. 98–160.
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IBy 1598, there were pressing reasons to welcome the end of the war. The English
naval campaign of the summer of 1597 had been disastrous, failing to assault the
Spanish ﬂeet at Ferrol or to capture the convoy of Spanish treasure from the West
Indies.15 The dreadful harvest failures of 1594–7 exacerbated fears of social unrest,
while in Ireland the crisis of English authority was deepened in mid-October 1597
by the death of the new deputy, Lord Burgh. Meanwhile the military muscle of
Spain, ﬁghting an alliance of France, England, and the United Provinces, was
massively over-stretched: in November 1596, Philip II stopped paying interest
on his debts, eﬀectively declaring his bankruptcy. Henry IV, however, the ally of
England and the Dutch, also deemed peace essential to the restoration of the
prosperity of his war-ravaged kingdom. Encouraged by the urgings of the papacy,
the French king believed that he could reach agreeable terms with Spain by the
winter of 1597.16
As the terms of the Triple Alliance of 1596 between France, England, and
the United Provinces dictated that France could not treat individually with the
enemy, Henry invited Elizabeth and the Dutch to discuss possible terms for an
over-arching peace between the allies and Spain.17 Sir Robert Cecil led a com-
mission to France for talks in February 1598, which was joined by a similar Dutch
delegation.18 Whatever ambivalence Elizabeth felt towards the prospect of peace
with Spain, the queen instructed her commissioners to signal her willingness to
engage in negotiations, provided that a series of conditions could be met, which
included the guarantee of the security of the Dutch Protestants, and the resto-
ration of the ancient political and religious liberties of the Low Countries. In the
course of frustrating talks with Henry, however, English intelligence revealed that
the king of France had been far from open in his dealings with Elizabeth, and had
15 The following discussion is taken from R. B. Wernham, Return of the armadas : the last years of the
Elizabethan war with Spain (Oxford, 1994) ; MacCaﬀrey, Elizabeth I : war and politics, pp. 196–298; P. E. J.
Hammer, Elizabeth’s wars : war, government and society in Tudor England, 1544–1604 (Basingstoke, 2003),
pp. 190–235; Paul C. Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621: the failure of grand strategy (New
Haven, CT, and London, 2000) ; Nathan Goodman, Diplomatic relations between England and Spain with
special reference to English opinion (Philadelphia, PA, 1925) ; Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the revolt in
the Netherlands (London, 1970) ; Adams, ‘Protestant cause’ ; J. C. Grayson, ‘From protectorate to part-
nership: Anglo-Dutch relations, 1598–1625’ (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1978), pp. 19–47.
16 Geoﬀrey Parker, The grand strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT, and London, 1998), pp. 278–9.
17 In November 1597, Henry sent the envoy Hurault de Maisse to Elizabeth, see G. B. Harrison, ed.
and trans., A journal of all that was accomplished by Monsieur de Maisse ambassador in England from King Henri IV
to Queen Elizabeth anno domini 1597 (London, 1931).
18 Cecil’s mission can be read inHistorical Manuscripts Commission : a calendar of the manuscripts of the Most
Hon. the marquis of Salisbury, KG, &c, preserved at Hatﬁeld House, Hertfordshire (HMC Salisbury), (12 vols.,
London, 1888–1973), VIII, pp. 90–9, 104–12, 118–27, XXIII, pp. 10–74; Thomas Birch, An historical view of
the negociations between the courts of England, France, and Brussels, from the year 1592 to 1617 (1749), pp. 97–164.
Burghley made notes on the pros and cons of accepting a peace oﬀered in the course of these nego-
tiations, ‘Considerations of ye motivation for a treaty of peace w[i]th the K. of Spayn’, British Library
(BL), MS Lansdowne 103, fos. 243r–251v; and The National Archives (TNA), State Papers (SP),
12/266/3.
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already agreed terms with Philip. The Treaty of Vervins, however, allowed a six-
month window within which Elizabeth might choose to join the Franco-Spanish
settlement. Although furious with Henry’s desertion of the allies, Elizabeth sig-
nalled to the French king that she was willing to continue to consider negotiations
for a general peace that would include the Dutch.19
With the problem of peace now laid openly on the diplomatic table, the Dutch
negotiated furiously with Elizabeth in late spring and summer to persuade the
queen from making her own separate settlement with Spain. In a position of
relative strength, Elizabeth renewed her alliance with the United Provinces on
6 August on terms which transferred most of the ﬁscal burden of English arms
to the States General, while reserving her own right to negotiate for a separate
peace.20
Elizabeth, who had invested so much money in the Dutch cause, continued to
fear the grave security risks that England would face were the United Provinces
to be reduced to Spanish rule by military force. There were also strong reasons to
suspect that Spain had no genuine desire for rapprochement with England. The
English still entertained substantial fears of Spanish aggression towards England,
nourished by failed raids by Spanish ﬂeets in 1596 and 1597, and by Spain’s
support of Tyrone’s rebellion. When Philip II died on 3 September 1598 (OS), he
was succeeded by his son, Philip III, an enthusiastic advocate of the continuation
of the war. Within two months of his father’s death, the young king demonstrated
his aggressive intentions towards the Dutch with the imposition of a trade em-
bargo and new plans to launch an invasion of England. Ironically, Philip III
hoped that the Treaty of Vervins itself would allow Spain to concentrate its
military resources against Protestant enemies in England and the Netherlands.
In July 1599, reports of a renewed naval assault energized the privy council to
mobilize England’s defences to repel Spanish forces on a scale not seen since the
Armada of 1588, causing widespread rumour and panic in London.21
As Paul Allen has shown, when the Spanish government debated peace with
England and the United Provinces in the late 1590s, it was for reason of state and
necessity rather than irenic or paciﬁc ideals. Spanish councillors and arbitristas
argued that peace should be pursued as a regrettable but temporary strategy, to
lull the heretic enemies into a false sense of security and ease so that the Spanish
military machine might be re-oiled.22 A vital development in relations between
19 The Treaty of Vervins was published by Henry two weeks after its signature. For Elizabeth’s
response to Henry see G. G. Butler, The Edmondes papers : a selection from the correspondence of Sir Thomas
Edmondes (Roxburghe Club, London, 1913) pp. 331–8.
20 The terms were ﬁnally ratiﬁed by the States General of the United Provinces on 30 Dec. ;
Wernham, Return of the armadas, p. 243.
21 The ﬂeet had been intended to attack England, but had been diverted to attack a Dutch ﬂeet oﬀ
the coast of the Azores; Parker, Grand strategy, p. 279. John Chamberlain reported the widespread panic
in the capital at the perception of military unpreparedness for an invasion; N. E. McLure, ed., The
letters of John Chamberlain (2 vols., Philadelphia, PA, 1939), I, pp. 80–5.
22 Allen, Pax Hispanica, pp. vii–x, 18–61.
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the warring states had occurred, however, just four days after the signature of the
Treaty of Vervins, when Philip II bestowed the sovereignty of the Netherlands
upon his daughter Isabella, who was betrothed to his nephew, the cardinal-
archduke Albert of Austria.23 The grant was for the whole of the Netherlands,
although the de facto power of the ‘archdukes ’ lay in the ‘obedient ’ Southern
Provinces, whose sovereignty was accepted by the States General of the South in
August.24
In England and the Netherlands, a diﬀerent path to peace and the problem of
Dutch resistance appeared to have emerged. Rumours of Philip II’s intentions
had circulated at the English court since the winter of 1597, and Elizabeth had
initially responded with enthusiasm: if the Low Countries could be reunited as
an independent polity, peace with Spain could be made without conceding the
Spanish reconquest of the Netherlands.25 Elizabeth soon realized, though, that
serious problems inhibited a settlement based on the assumption that the arch-
dukes would establish their sovereignty over the whole of the Netherlands. When
the deed of the donation was made public, on 26 April (OS) it soon became clear
across Europe that the independent duchy of Burgundy had clearly not been
reborn. The (obvious) reality of the authority of the archdukes was their absolute
dependence on Spain for ﬁnancial and military support. Even the ﬁnality of the
grant was suspected. Although Philip II had intended that the Netherlands should
descend to any oﬀspring produced by his daughter and nephew – a stipulation
bitterly resented by Philip III – the provinces were to revert to Spain in the event
that the archdukes failed to produce an heir.26 Although the States in Brussels
insisted that their acceptance of the donation and the sovereignty of Albert and
Isabella should be accompanied by overtures of peace towards the Northern
rebel provinces, the United Provinces vigorously spurned the sovereignty of the
archdukes, and continued to resist the Habsburgs in the name of liberty and
freedom of religion.27
Nevertheless, the new situation in the Netherlands was still promising for
those who hoped that England could be extricated from war on the continent.
Albert strongly desired an Anglo-Spanish peace, which would ease the establish-
ment of the authority of the archdukes in the Netherlands. Sensing willingness
in England, the government in Brussels also opened up negotiations with
Robert Cecil and Elizabeth, sending an envoy, Jerome Coomans, on four mis-
sions to the English court in 1599, to propose a treaty that might also encompass
reconciliation with the Dutch. The following February, the more formal visit to
London of Audencier Verreycken was celebrated with elaborate ceremonial and
23 The marriage was formally celebrated on 8 Apr. 1599 (OS).
24 Werner Thomas, ‘Andromeda unbound: the reign of Albert & Isabella in the Southern
Netherlands, 1598–1621’, in Thomas and Duerloo, eds., Albert and Isabella, pp. 2–3.
25 For Elizabeth’s initially delighted response see De Maisse, Journal, p. 83.
26 The Infanta issued a procuration giving absolute authority to Albert to govern on 20 May (OS) ;
Thomas, ‘Andromeda unbound’, p. 3 ; Allen, Pax Hispanica, p. 18.
27 P. Geyl, The revolt of the Netherlands, 1555–1609 (London, 1932), pp. 239–40.
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entertainment. Despite the panic over the so-called ‘Invisible Armada’ in July
1599, Rowland Whyte reported the general belief at Elizabeth’s court that peace
with Spain – ‘a thing very much desired here ’ – was imminent.28 Finally, in re-
sponse to these developments, Spanish and English delegates met at a conference
in Boulogne in May 1600, to discuss possible terms for an Anglo-Spanish peace.
Talks at Boulogne were doomed even before they began. For all the enthusi-
asm that had greeted Verreycken’s visit, his formal meeting with Elizabeth had
revealed the great unlikelihood that terms could presently be agreed.29 Aside from
the intractable problem of the autonomy of the Dutch, the Spanish demanded
that Elizabeth allow public toleration of Catholics, and that she hand over the
cautionary towns of Flushing and Brill (held as security for loans to the United
Provinces). They refused to allow English trade with the Indies, one of Elizabeth’s
most determined aims. These terms were intolerable to the English delegates, and
negotiations broke down amid squabbles over precedence.
The earl of Essex’s major written contribution to peace negotiations of 1598,
his Apologie, was composed in the aftermath of the Treaty of Vervins, when peace
was debated before Elizabeth renewed her alliance with the Dutch in August.
The treatise can probably be dated more precisely to July, when the earl was
absent from court after quarrelling with the queen over the appointment of the
new lord deputy.30 The opening lines of the Apologie captured the ﬁerce antag-
onism that fuelled debates about peace at court in the aftermath of Vervins. Essex
excoriated those who charged him ‘that all my counsels actions and indeauours
doe tend to keepe the state of England in continuall wars ’, and defended himself
as a ‘zealous patriot ’ from accusations of bloodthirsty militarism, apparently ﬁred
by Burghley.31 On the council, however, Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst, was
noted by contemporaries to be a particular proponent of peace, while Sir Robert
Cecil’s support of his father’s position was widely assumed.32
28 Croft, ‘Brussels and London’, p. 81; Wernham, Return of the armadas, p. 321 ; Arthur Collins, Letters
and memorials of state in the reigns of Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth… (2 vols., 1746), II, pp. 128, 130.
29 Cecil conﬁrmed his pessimism in a letter to his agent at the Scottish court ; HMC Salisbury, X,
pp. 93–4; Rowland Whyte was initially more positive about the forthcoming prospect of peace;
Collins, Letters and memorials, II, pp. 170–1; Goodman, Diplomatic relations, pp. 51–62.
30 As the English commissioners set out for France in February, Essex had written a letter to Robert
Cecil that warned that the Spanish did not intend a ‘ trew peace’, and that safety for the allies rested in
the continued pursuit of war; TNA, SP 78/41/177.
31 Robert Devereux, second earl of Essex, To Maister Anthony Bacon : an apologie of the earle of Essex
against those which falsly and maliciously taxe him to be the onely hinderer of the peace, and quiet of his countrey (1600),
sig. Ar. Camden relates that Burghley presented Essex with with Psalm 55, verse 23: ‘Bloodthirsty and
deceitful men shall not live out half their days ’ ; Tomus alter annalium rerum Anglicarum et Hibernicarum
regnante Elizabetha (hereafter Annales) (1627), p. 160. Sir Thomas Edmondes reported to Sir Robert
Sydney on 15 July that rumours in Paris were that the English were so divided and ‘schismaticall ’ over
the peace that no decisions could be reached; Historical Manuscript Commission : report on the manuscripts of
Lord De L’Isle & Dudley, preserved at Penshurst Place (2 vols., London, 1924–34), II, p. 356
32 In a private conference at the end of June, Buckhurst unsuccessfully tried to persuade
Oldenbarnevelt to accept his arguments for making peace; J. L. Motley,History of the United Netherlands :
from the death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years’ Truce – 1609 (4 vols., 1860–7), III, pp. 495–6. Buckhurst
was also described as the most ardent and consistent advocate of peace in the council’s debates in 1602;
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The earl’s arguments against the peace were centred on his unshakeable hos-
tility to the tyranny of Philip II. Throughout the 1590s, Elizabeth’s government
had justiﬁed the queen’s participation in the war as a struggle against the
universality of Spain’s imperial ambitions. Whereas previous justiﬁcations had
emphasized the tyranny of Philip’s governors and counsellors in the Netherlands,
the aggressive proclamation of 1591 drafted by Burghley, ‘Establishing commis-
sions against seminary priests and Jesuits ’, formally denounced the ‘violence and
malice ’ of the king of Spain himself, who waged ‘a most unjust and dangerous
war for all of Christendom’.33 Essex, however, had magniﬁed this rhetoric
of Spanish predations and violence into a complete vision of the conﬂict as
a cataclysmic struggle for liberty from the ‘ fearfull usurpation’ of the Spanish
tyrant himself, whose power must be crushed by oﬀensive warfare.34
Essex warned that this subtle ‘Sinons horse ’ could never be trusted : tyrants are
masters of deception, as Philip had proved in 1588, when he had pretended to
negotiate with Elizabeth while all the time preparing to launch the Armada.35
Furthermore, Philip’s religion would permit him to abrogate the terms of any
treatise because the pope assured him that oaths made to heretics could be bro-
ken.36 Essex predicted – quite accurately – that even the death of the ageing king
would not clear a path to peace : the future Philip III’s ‘bloud is hotter ’ for war,
‘his humour of ambition is like to be greater ’.37 Worse, the terms that Spain
would propose in the course of negotiations would be completely unacceptable.
Primarily they would include toleration of Catholicism, a demand that Essex
objected to as detrimental to Elizabeth’s sovereignty, a condition ‘only for a
conquerour to impose, and unﬁtte for a braue state ’, an equal treating for
peace.38 Spain would also demand custody of the cautionary towns, creating
unthinkable security dangers for England and the Low Countries, and trade links
with the Indies would not be opened to Elizabeth’s merchants. Essex’s objections
were entirely correct : the stalemate reached at the Boulogne conference in 1600
occurred for precisely these reasons, and because Spain, as Essex prophesized,
negotiated from a position of dominance, rather than one of equality. All
H. S. Scott, ed., ‘ Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, master of requests ’, Camden Miscellany, Camden
Fourth Series, 10 (London, 1902), pp. 49–50; for perceptions of Robert Cecil’s inclination to peace in
the negotiations leading up to the Boulogne conference see Goodman, Diplomatic relations, p. 38;
Laﬄeur de Kermaingant, L’ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV: mission de J. de Thumery, Sieur de
Boissise, 1598–1602 (Paris, 1886), pp. 336–7.
33 Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin, eds., Tudor royal proclamations (3 vols., New Haven, CT, and
London, 1964–9), III, p. 86.
34 TNA, SP 12/259/12. See P. E. J. Hammer, The polarization of Elizabethan politics : the political career of
Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex, 1565–1597 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 246–7.
35 Devereux, Apologie, sig. [B4]r. 36 Ibid., sig. C2r.
37 Ibid., sig. Cr. Essex’s intelligence agent in Venice, Dr Henry Hawkins, had warned at the end of
February 1597 that the future Philip III was ‘very hott & importunate w[i]th his father to goe to these
warres ’, Lambeth Palace Library, MS 661, fo. 22r–v.
38 Devereux, Apologie, sig. Dv. For Essex and toleration see Hammer, Polarization of Elizabethan politics,
pp. 174–8.
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negotiations, in any case, and any treaty that might result from negotiation with
the Spanish monarchy, would be a temporary ruse to ‘sing vs asleepe with the
name of peace, till he may rouse us from sleepe by a thundering warre ’.39
Essex’s textbook humanist understanding of strenuous virtue deﬁned a
ﬂourishing commonwealth as sustained by the militarism and self-sacriﬁce of its
inhabitants, amply evidenced by the ‘ spirit and alacrity ’ of the English.40 To
those who pleaded the poverty of the realm, Essex breezily insisted that the ﬁscal
burden of an oﬀensive war could be maintained at 150,000 pounds per annum
through the subsidy, contributions from the Dutch, and a pension from Henry
IV. Although Essex’s ﬁgures were hardly rooted in sober economic calculation of
the ﬁscal capabilities of the Elizabethan state, he sternly denounced those who
argued that the present economic diﬃculties necessitated peace, yet spent lavishly
on ‘sumptuous buildings, inﬁnite plate, and costly furniture of houses ’. Here his
scorn was clearly directed at the growing reputation of the Cecils for ﬁnancial
rapacity, conﬁrmed in physical form in the great Cecilian building projects.41
The religious dimension to Essex’s militarism was complex. As a sporadic ad-
vocate of toleration of Catholic worship, Essex had tended to appeal to a broader
confessional audience in England and abroad, and to justify the war as a struggle
for the liberty of all the states of Christendom – Catholic and Protestant
alike – which were threatened by the might of Spain.42 Essex speciﬁcally deﬁned
the tyranny of Philip and the papacy as an ambition for dominion that made the
Spanish monarchy ‘a generall enemie to the libertie of Christendome’, and a
threat to all free states.43 The language of the Apologie, however, contained
stronger strains of the confessional militarism that had shaped the international
Protestantism of the Sidney and Leicester circles.44 The Spanish were the ‘chiefe
enemy of our religion’, egged on by the ‘undertaking Pope’ who sought ‘a gen-
erall league against all such, as doe not, or will not acknowledge the omnipotency
of his Bulles ’.45
Essex also presented Elizabeth’s obligations to her Dutch allies as an essential
defence of the freedom of the United Provinces from Spain’s thirst for secular
power. He insisted that peace would require the queen to abandon England’s
Protestant brethren, who in turn would be forced to acknowledge the king of
Spain’s sovereignty, or ‘him that shall claime vnder him for their Soueraigne, as
39 Devereux, Apologie, sig. Er. 40 Ibid., sig. D3v.
41 Ibid. Essex also wilfully refused to take into account the massive expense demanded by military
operations in Ireland. For the Cecils as builders see ‘Introduction’, in P. Croft, ed., Patronage, culture and
power : the early Cecils (New Haven, CT, and London, 2002), pp. ix–x. No builder himself, Essex had
massive debts from ploughing his own money into military campaigns; Hammer, Polarization of
Elizabethan politics, pp. 227–9.
42 Ibid., pp. 143, 241–7, 260–1; Alexandra Gajda, ‘Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex and political
culture, c. 1595–c. 1600’ (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 2005), pp. 82–106.
43 Devereux, Apologie, sig. A3r.
44 Adams, ‘Protestant cause’, pp. 1–103; Blair Worden, The sound of virtue : Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and
Elizabethan politics (New Haven, CT, and London, 1996), pp. 219–94.
45 Devereux, Apologie, sig. [D4r–v].
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the Duke of Burgundie ’. This would impose ‘ slauerie vpon the Netherlandes ’.46 Essex
rejected the notion that the translation of sovereignty to Isabella and Albert would
solve England’s diplomatic conundrum: instead, the marriage would have dire
consequences for the English succession, placing across the Channel ‘ the Infant
the person whose title to the crown of England, Parsons so laboured to prooue’ !47
Moreover, Essex insisted that this alleged division of the Netherlands from Spain
would be but a covert pretext to achieve what military aggression had failed to do:
reducing the Netherlands to the ‘absolute ’ rule of Spain, through indirect means.
Essex had been courted by the Dutch as their obvious ally on the English privy
council, and these lines of reasoning reﬂected Essex’s intimate knowledge of the
arguments used by the States General to persuade Elizabeth to renew the Anglo-
Dutch alliance.48 Essex’s treatment, though, of the imminent change in the pol-
itical structure of the United Provinces also revealed his own reﬂections on the
nature of the Dutch polity. It would be woeful were the ‘authority of the generall
states, and the present forme of gouernment of the vnited provinces [to] be
broaken and dissolved, a monarchie set vp and a prince acknowledged’ once
again. In such a state, ‘ there shall nothing limit the princes absoluteness, but his
owne will. The strength of a contract cannot limit it. ’49 The repression of religious
liberty would surely follow, and the newly enslaved Dutch would succumb to
‘ idolatrie ’ to ‘win the fauour of the most tirannical prince in the erth’.50
Although Elizabeth’s consistent aim in succouring the Dutch had been to
prevent the ‘reduction ’ of the Low Countries to the direct rule of Spain, the
solution she publicly sought was the restoration of Habsburg overlordship. In his
Apologie, however, Essex clearly endorsed the federated polity of the United
Provinces as a legitimate and free form of government ; entirely preferable to
‘absolute ’ monarchy ‘unlimited’ by contract.51 Essex’s admiration for the martial
virtue and liberty of the United Provinces was also linked to their current con-
stitutional arrangements. If England were to abandon the Dutch, they would be
tempted by Philip’s siren-song of peace, because in the federated decision-making
of the States General, where ‘ there is not like to be vnanimitie in opinion’, a
fearful majority might override the strenuous virtue of the military leaders.
Despite this weakness, Essex deﬁned the sovereignty of the States General in
more positive terms : it was rooted in the grant of a voice to all provinces ‘ it being
vnsafe for them to denie libertie of voyce to any, such libertie being the true cause of
their taking armes, and standing out against the common enemie ’ (my italics). Here
46 Ibid., sig. C2r. 47 Ibid., sig. C3v.
48 The envoy Noel de Caron’s dealings with Essex had been especially close since the earl’s elev-
ation to the Mastership of the Ordnance in 1596; Essex had also assumed some of Robert Cecil’s
secretarial duties when the latter was absent in France early in 1598, and copies of the arguments of the
envoys of the States General survive in his hand and the hand of his secretary, Edward Reynolds; see
HMC Salisbury, VIII, pp. 20, 250, 257 ; Collins, Letters and Memorials, II, pp. 48, 89.
49 Devereux, Apologie, sig. C2r. 50 Ibid., sig. C3r.
51 Oldenbarnevelt made exactly the same point to Sir Robert Cecil in the negotiations before
Vervins; Wernham, Return of the armadas, p. 236.
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the causes of the Dutch revolt were described as the defence of free speech and
representation from the shared enemy of liberty, the king of Spain.52
I I
Although Essex’s Apologie was clearly written in the context of Essex’s absence
from the court and his inability to argue his position on the privy council, the
tract was disseminated widely, with scores of archival copies surviving from
the late Elizabethan and Jacobean period.53 The intended wider audience for the
treatise is unclear. When the manuscript was spread abroad in 1598, the earl
pleaded ignorance, claiming that it had either been stolen from his bedroom by
servants, or disseminated by his friend Fulke Greville, without authorization. Nor
is there any clear evidence linking Essex to the printed edition of the Apologie in
1600, which emerged when he was suspended from political oﬃce and in disgrace
with Elizabeth.54 Essex’s secretariat and associates, however, were widely prac-
tised in the dissemination of texts intended to promote a particular image of the
earl to a semi-public audience, and it seems highly likely that the Apologie was
conceived with a similar readership in mind.55 The compositional form of the
treatise is telling. By framing the Apologie as a letter to Anthony Bacon, Essex’s
great friend and intelligence gatherer, Essex employed an epistolary framework
very common to late sixteenth-century polemic and news pamphlets.
Furthermore, it is apparent that the Apologie was one of several similar pieces
written in response to the debates about peace after the Treatise of Vervins. One
treatise in the Lansdowne manuscripts has annotations by Robert Beale, clerk of
the privy council, and was probably written by Beale for Burghley’s use. The rest
are anonymous, although the existence of multiple copies of some suggests that
they, like the Apologie, were also circulated in manuscript coteries. Several treatises
argued, with Essex, that peace threatened the welfare of England. Others strongly
disagreed, and urged the incontrovertible beneﬁts of peace, and the necessity of
accommodation with Spain. When thus contextualized, Essex’s Apologie seems
simply the most extended and best-known contribution to a debate about foreign
policy argued not merely in the council chamber, but also in prose treatises and
position papers.
The treatise in the Lansdowne manuscripts, written in May 1598, argued
in favour of the advantages of the peace, and listed answers to objections and
obstacles.56 A number of the anonymous treatises are in the Petyt manuscripts in
52 Devereux, Apologie, sig. [C4v].
53 A further printed version appeared in 1603, a Dutch translation the same year. In the British
Library, in the Additional Manuscripts alone, are the following copies : MSS 4128, fos. 29–42v, 4129,
fos. 1–15, 38137, fos. 161–72, 48063 (Yelverton MS 69), fos. 238–51, 72411, fos. 1–14.
54 The appearance of the Apologie exacerbated Elizabeth’s hostility to Essex, as she bridled at further
evidence of the earl’s ‘popularity ’ ; Hammer, ‘Smiling crocodile’.
55 P. E. J. Hammer, ‘Myth-making: politics, propaganda and the capture of Cadiz in 1596’,
Historical Journal, 40 (1997), pp. 621–42. 56 BL, MS Lansdowne 103, fos. 252r–257r.
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Inner Temple Library. In favour of continuation of the war are ‘The resolution of
some doubts now cast to move simple men to embrace the conditions of peace ’,
and ‘An Answer to certen triﬂing reasons alleaged to perswade her Matie and the
English nation to conclude peace with the Spaniards ’.57 The collection also con-
tains four copies of ‘Considerations towching the peace nowe in speache’, which
argued that it was manifestly ‘better to settle the present quietnes of this Realme’
than to gamble on the outcome of ‘a chargeable, uncerteyne, fruteles, & endless
warre ’.58 Also in the British Library are two copies of a zesty treatise against
the peace penned by an ideological associate of Essex, which echoed the earl’s
own denunciation of those who ‘censure farr more worthie Spirits touching
the peace ’.59 By contrast, other tracts in the Cotton manuscripts argued that the
‘Beneﬁtts of peace with Spaine ’ would bring ‘perfect loue and amitie ’ between
England and her neighbours.60 A further reﬂection on the prospect of reconcili-
ation argued that the imminent marriage of Albert and Isabella oﬀered a brilliant
diplomatic opportunity to bring a permanent resolution to the Netherlands crisis.61
The signiﬁcance of these texts was recorded by William Camden, who followed
his account of English diplomacy in the spring and summer of 1598 with a
description of domestic discourse : ‘ it was acutely debated in England, whether it
would be for the beneﬁt of the commonwealth and the Queen to contract peace
with the Spaniard’.62 Camden summarized the arguments for and against peace
replicating exactly the points made by authors of the position papers, in some
instances quoting verbatim from the treatises. Camden clearly situated this de-
bate in court circles, and named Burghley and Essex as representing the polarities
of the arguments pro and contra peace. By using the passive voice, however, he
described the substance of the arguments while remaining frustratingly silent
about the identity and number of contributors to the debate, and the provenance,
circulation, and readership of the tracts.
The treatises adopted a similar form, most setting out a set of arguments in
utramque partem, before concluding either in favour of the peace or for continuation
of the war. Could Spain be trusted to make a secure peace? Upon what conditions
would Philip be willing to treat? Was the English state relentlessly over-stretched,
or a vigorous military power, capable of bringing the war to a victorious con-
clusion? And – crucially – what would be the fate of the Dutch Protestants?
Those wanting hostilities rekindled echoed Essex’s arguments. The Spanish
monarchy oﬀered but a ‘pretended peace ’, since Catholics would not bind
57 Inner Temple Library (ITL), MS Petyt 538, xlvi, fos. 36r–41r, 42r–46r.
58 Ibid., fos. 47r–48v, 103r–106v, 130r–134v, 139r–140r. Further copies are BL, MS Cotton, Galba
DXII, fos. 188r–198r and BL, MS Stowe, 164, fos. 86r–89r.
59 BL, MS Stowe 161, fos. 37r–64r, ‘A discourse touching the peace’ ; a copy is BL, MS Stowe 151,
fos. 74r–96r.
60 BL, MS Cotton, Caligula EIX, ii, fo. 155r–v; BL, MS Cotton, Titus CVII, fos. 146r–148r.
61 BL, MS Cotton, Titus CVII, fos. 3r–4v.
62 Camden, Annales, p. 155; ‘Accurate interim discpeatur in Anglia, an in reipub. & Reginae rem
esset, pacem cum Hispano pacisci. ’
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themselves to oaths made with heretics.63 Essex’s humanist militarism also per-
vaded the pro-war treatises. One author insisted that although ‘this lande had
never more valiant and experte men of warre ’, peace would demilitarize the
valiant nation and make her dangerously vulnerable.64 Another argued that ‘ long
peace’ stimulated some ‘by greate prosperity to waxe insolent, others by abon-
dance to waxe delicate, superﬂuous and eﬀeminate’.65 It is worth noting that this
Machiavellian conﬂation of the ﬂourishing state and the martial virtue of its
citizens was shared by those Spanish arbitristas who similarly argued that peace
would disarm and corrode the strenuous militarism of Spain’s enemies.66
The treatises which favoured continuation of the war advanced strong, prag-
matic arguments for refusing any Spanish olive-branch. They emphasized the
strategic danger to England if the Dutch Protestants should conclude a separate
peace with Spain.67 The ﬁnancial beneﬁts of reimbursement by the rebel states
were contrasted with the crippled ﬁnances of the Spanish crown, which would
be utterly devastated were the passage of New World treasure to be stemmed.68
Most acutely, the anonymous authors insisted that the tyrant’s universal ambi-
tions remained unchanged: any negotiated peace in the current situation of
military stalemate would be a temporary deception that would allow Spain to
recover from her present weakness.69 Again, these warnings closely reﬂected the
pragmatic arguments for peace expressed in contemporary Spanish political
debate.
It is striking, though, that those tracts which contained a strong ideological
opposition to the peace all dwelt, like Essex, in urgent rhetoric, on the ‘ tirannie ’
of the enemy, and the ceaseless ambition of the Spanish who ‘seeke under pre-
tence of Religion our Lyves, our Libertie, our Friendes and Countrie ’.70 The aims
of ‘ so perﬁdious an enemie ’ were most immediately to ‘reduce the Low Countries
under absolute obedience’.71 One tract argued that the United Provinces were
engaged in a struggle for their own political liberty and autonomy – their ‘am-
bition and desire to command’ – which had been cemented by ‘having gouerned
many yeres togeather ’.72
Even more stridently than in Essex’s Apologie, the authors of the treatises that
favoured the war also associated this defence of freedom from tyranny with an
apocalyptic vision of confessional conﬂict. One author described the military
cause as ‘undertaken for the defence of godes truth against an Antechriste and his
adherents … for the succour of distressed Christians ioyned to us … in com-
munion of religion’. Another implored ‘ let all true Christians abhorre the tyranny
of Antichrist and pride and ambition of the Spaniard that dryveth us to this
extremyty’.73
63 ITL, MS Petyt 538, xlvi, fo. 36v. 64 Ibid., fo. 44r. 65 BL, MS Stowe 161, fo. 38v.
66 See above, pp. 6–7. 67 ITL, Petyt MS 538, xlvi, fo. 36r.
68 BL, MS Stowe 161, fo. 58v; ITL, Petyt MS 538, xlvi, fo. 38r.
69 BL, MS Stowe 161, fo. 49r ; ITL, Petyt MS 538, vol. xlvi, fo. 40v.
70 Ibid., fos. 39r, 45v. 71 Ibid., fo. 44v. 72 BL, MS Stowe 161, fos. 49r–v.
73 ITL, MS Petyt 538, vol. xlvi, fos. 38r, 39r, 46r.
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The treatises that argued in favour of the peace did so for obvious reasons.
Peace was a God-given state to which all ‘civile Societie ’ and ‘Christean Princes ’
should aspire.74 Elizabeth’s subjects could no longer bear the ﬁnancial burden of
the war – ‘a reason unanswerable ’ – while the menace of Tyrone loomed ever
larger.75 The opening of trade with Spain’s dominions would surely follow,
bringing long-desired relief to the economic hardships of Elizabeth’s merchants.
Although these tracts invoked the ideal of a united Christendom, they were
couched in the language of reason of state ; of necessity, policy, and interest. ‘To
direct our warrs agaynst his prouinces weare opus inﬁnitum ’ wrote one author of
the unlikelihood of victory against Spain.76 ‘The Lawes of Nature … preferreth
Sui conseruationem, before all other respects. ’77 Another described the ‘ interest ’ of
Elizabeth in the ‘commoditie of the peace’, and the likelihood that England and a
resurgent France could ‘ballance the force of Spaine’.78
For all his inclinations towards peace, Burghley, like Essex, continued to deﬁne
the grievances of the inhabitants of the Low Countries as an understandable
response to the ‘ tyranous ’ oppressions of Spanish government.79 In striking
contrast, however, the authors of the anonymous pro-peace tracts did not con-
ceptualize of the war as a cataclysmic struggle between the forces of tyranny and
liberty, religious or secular. The authors of the tracts in favour of peace referred to
the Spanish monarch not as a tyrant, bent on the repression of religious and
political liberty, but as the ‘enemy’ or the ‘king of Spain ’, with whom conditions
could be struck on the grounds of mutual interest, political and economic. Rather
than a vital demonstration of Spain’s insatiable desire for universal monarchy, the
mighty power of the Spanish king was invoked to argue that the English could
never emerge victorious from the war.80
This ideological distinction between the authors of pro-peace and pro-war
tracts was also underscored by marked diﬀerences in attitudes to the United
Provinces. The arguments of the pro-peace tracts did not dwell on Philip’s
oppression of the liberties of his subjects in the Low Countries. Instead they re-
emphasized that Elizabeth’s succour of the Dutch had not been intended to de-
fend the vulnerable liberty of a newly hatched polity, but to restore ‘ the ancient
leagues in tearmes … as they were in the tymes of Charles the Emperor ’, the
justiﬁcation of limited intervention that had been consistently used by the queen
to legitimize her support of the Dutch.81 Were Elizabeth to make peace with
Spain the Dutch Protestants could reach a separate agreement with Madrid that
74 Ibid., fo. 47r.
75 BL, MS Cotton, Titus CVII, fo. 147r. 76 Ibid., fo. 146r. 77 Ibid., fo. 148r.
78 ITL, MS Petyt 538, lxvi, fos. 48r, 47v.
79 BL, MS Lansdowne 103, fo. 249v, Burghley’s notes on the proposals put forward by Henry IV
before the Treaty of Vervins. 80 BL, MS Cotton, Titus CVII, fos. 146r–148r.
81 ITL, MS Petyt 538, lxvi, fo. 48r; the notes corrected by Beale typically detailed how the Low
Countries might be paciﬁed with ‘a ratiﬁcation of all former priuiledges as they weare in the time of
the Emperor Charles ’, and proposed the establishment of a Council of State, staﬀed entirely by natives
of the Low Countries ; BL, MS Lansdowne 103, fos. 254v–255r.
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would allow them to preserve some kind of autonomy.82 Another author insisted
that the solution to peace in Western Christendom lay in Philip II’s proposals to
divide the Low Countries from Spain in perpetuity, under the rule of his daughter
and nephew.83
The pro-peace authors did not envisage the war as an apocalyptic battle with
the forces of popery, or view the English and Dutch as brethren, united in a
common religious cause. Rather they demonstrated considerable resentment of
the mercantile prosperity of the Dutch, who continued to trade with Spain when
Elizabeth’s merchants were prohibited. The authors of the pro-peace tracts also
exhibited a wary dislike of the subversive implications of the rebel provinces’
abjuration of Spanish sovereignty, which contrasted signiﬁcantly with Essex’s
sympathetic appraisal. One reminded readers that Elizabeth had refused the
sovereignty of the Low Countries as ‘ it could not be so well grounded in iustice ’.84
Elsewhere, strong dislike of the ‘popular ’ government of the United Provinces
was manifested more overtly. One author drew blistering comparisons between
the Swiss Cantons and the United Provinces, both of which had renounced a
Habsburg lord’s authority. The ‘blunt Democraticall weapons’ used by ‘these
popular estatz [to] impugne a peace with Spayne’ were characteristic of the
‘manie strange positions ’ adopted by ‘ theise cantonisinge people ’.85 Reﬂecting
the anxiety felt by many of the elite about imminent social unrest caused by the
ﬁscal burden of the war, another author warned that the continuance of ‘new-
devised taxations ’ to prolong the conﬂict might cause Elizabeth’s own subjects to
revolt against their social superiors. The discontented English might, like ‘ye
Zwitzers ’, ‘ follow their example & reduce this Monarchie to a popular state ’ ; or,
equally, the ‘reduced’ monarchy and ‘popular ’ state of the United Provinces.86
Some signiﬁcant points emerge from these tracts. The arguments for war were
not solely grounded in idealization of glory and arms, but evinced wholly prag-
matic and accurate fears about Spain’s disinclination to make lasting peace. The
diﬀerent positions adopted by authors in favour of or hostile to peace, however,
revealed divisions over attitudes to political authority, the legitimacy of resistance,
non-monarchical government, and the threat of tyranny, and demonstrate that
Elizabethans held divergent attitudes towards a confessionalized foreign policy.
These diﬀering ideological positions were thrown into relief by the response of the
authors of these treatises to the Dutch revolt.
I I I
The conceptual problem of supporting the ‘rebel ’ Dutch had already taxed
the dexterity of apologists for Elizabeth’s foreign policy. Theories of resistance
articulated on the continent by French, Dutch, and Scottish writers circulated
82 ITL, MS Petyt 538, lxvi, fo. 47v. 83 BL, MS Cotton Titus CVII, fos. 3r–4v.
84 ITL, MS Petyt 538, lxvi, fo. 47r. 85 BL, MS Cotton Titus CVII, fos. 3v–4r.
86 Ibid., fos. 147r–v; see also Camden, Annales, pp. 155–60.
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in imported texts, especially in the circles of Sir Philip Sidney and the earl of
Leicester, as well as among Essex’s followers in the 1590s, underpinning their
ideological vision of international alliance against the forces of tyranny in
Christendom.87 In 1581, William of Orange’s Apology had been printed in English
translation, a treatise that endorsed the rights of oppressed peoples to rise against
rulers who had broken their contractual obligations to their subjects.88 From the
mid-1580s, however, the regime had grown increasingly concerned to denounce
the resistance theories of English Catholic exiles, and to propagate the doctrine of
absolute obedience of subjects to secular authority expounded in the Homilie
agaynst disobedience and wylful rebellion (1570). An English translation of Book IV of
Vindicae, contra tyrannos, which justiﬁed the intervention of foreign rulers to relieve
oppressed soldiers, was published in 1588 as A short apologie for Christian souldiours.
A marginal gloss, however, sternly directed the reader to ‘reade this aduisedly
because we may not by the worde of God resist our own prince if he be wicked’.89
Meanwhile, the remaining four books of the Vindiciae, which legitimized the rising
of subjects, were not printed in a vernacular translation until the Civil Wars of the
mid-seventeenth century.
The circle was squared in Thomas Bilson’s The true diﬀerence between Christian
subiection and unchristian rebellion (1585), primarily written to denounce theories of
the papal deposing power which ‘released’ subjects from their allegiance to
Elizabeth. Bilson admitted that the laws of certain polities, where the monarch
was elected, or where speciﬁc constitutional arrangements prevailed, permitted
subjects to depose rulers. This theory was illustrated by reference to the powers of
the Holy Roman Emperor, but also applied implicitly to the authority of the
Habsburg rulers in the Low Countries. By contrast, Bilson insisted that the
monarchies of Spain, France, Scotland, and England were ‘absolute ’ mon-
archies, whose princes inherited by succession. The subjects of absolute monarchs
were utterly bound to obedience and passive resistance.90
87 See in particular Worden, Sound of virtue, ch. 16; James E. Phillips, ‘George Buchanan and the
Sidney circle ’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 12 (1948), pp. 23–55; Alexandra Gajda, ‘The State of
Christendom : history, political thought and the Essex circle ’, Historical Research, 81 (2008), pp. 423–46.
88 The apologie or defence of the most noble Prince William, by the grace of God, Prince of Orange (1581). See
Martin Van Gelderen, The political thought of the Dutch revolt, 1555–1590 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 151–3.
89 H. P., A short apologie for Christian souldiours : wherein is conteined, how that we ought both to propagate, and
also if neede require, to defende by force of armes, the Catholike Church of Christ, against the tyrannie of Antichrist and his
adherentes (1588), unpaginated. The printer was John Wolfe, of whom, see below. J. H. M. Salmon, The
French wars of religion in English political thought (Oxford, 1959), pp. 15–20. Salmon points out that other
treatises containing ‘Huguenot theoretical views’ that endorsed resistance, including Francois
Hotman’s Francogallia (1573) and Theodore de Be´ze’s Du droit des magistrates sur leurs sujects (1574), were
not translated for publication in English.
90 Thomas Bilson, The true diﬀerence between Christian subiection and unchristian rebellion: wherein the princes
lawfull power to commound for trueth, and indepriuable right to beare the sword are defended against the Popes censures
and the Iesuits sophismes vttered in their apologie and defence of English Catholikes : with a demonstration that the thinges
refourmed in the Church of England by the lawes of this realme are truely Catholike, notwithstanding the vaine shew made
to the contrary in their late Rhemish Testament (Oxford), pp. 509–16 passim.
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Alberico Gentili, the Protestant Italian Regius Professor of Civil Law at
Oxford, reached diﬀerent conclusions when he grappled with the same problems
in the ﬁnal published version of his seminal treatise on international law, De iure
belli libri tres (1598). Gentili’s groundbreaking delineation of the laws of war that
governed relations between states was markedly shaped by his passionate hostility
to Spain, and his discussion of oﬀensive and defensive wars impressed the necessity
of action against tyrants whose ambitions threatened the security of Christendom.
With English support of the Dutch in mind, Gentili described the intervention of
foreign states to succour oppressed subjects as a godly duty, an argument which
led him, like Bilson, to address the legitimacy of the resistance of subjects.
Gentili’s conservative instinct was to denounce rebellion in all circumstances : in
the next reign, his political writings would endorse James VI and I’s theories of
monarchy, and notions of absolute obedience. He also argued, with Bilson, that
the powers of princes varied, and could be more or less absolute or circumscribed
depending on the constitution of the particular polity. In this earlier work, how-
ever, Gentili placed signiﬁcant emphasis on the mutual, contractual obligations
that bound all rulers and subjects, and concluded that subjects who occupied ‘a
particular public position’ (inferior magistrates) in extraordinary circumstances
could lawfully resist tyrants by force of arms.91
The publication of De iure belli in 1598 gives pause for thought. The treatise was
prefaced by a fulsome dedication to Essex, who was godfather to Gentili’s son,
while the earl’s own Apologie concluded with a quotation from De iure belli ’s analysis
of defensive wars.92 Unlike the earlier printed versions of parts of the treatise,
which were published by John Wolfe in London and also dedicated to Essex, the
ﬁnal version of De iure belli was printed in Germany, possibly to expose the work to
a wider international audience. Published at a critical period in the diplomatic
relations of the warring states, Gentili’s work added substantial intellectual ballast
to Essex’s argument that the power of Spain must be deﬁnitively checked before
peace could be restored to Christendom.
I V
The most signiﬁcant body of printed texts to provide a commentary on the
prospect of peace emanated from the Netherlands, and dwelt speciﬁcally on
the implications of the donation of the sovereignty of the Low Countries to the
archdukes. The response of the United Provinces to the donation was, of course,
of fundamental signiﬁcance to England’s role in the war: despite the continued
91 Alberico Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, ed. Coleman Phillipson, trans. John C. Rolfe (2 vols., Oxford
and London, 1933), II, pp. 20, 50–1, 77–8; Gezina van den Molen, Alberico Gentili and the development of
international law: his life, work and times (Leiden, 1968), pp. 227–35; Diego Panizza, Alberico Gentili, giurista
ideologico nell’Inghilterra elisabettiana (Padua, 1981).
92 ‘ Justum id bellum quibus necessarium, copia arma, quibus nulla, nisi in armis, spes est ’,
Devereux, Apologie, sig. Ev; Gentili, De iure belli libri tres, I, p. 59; see Hammer, Polarization of Elizabethan
politics, pp. 239–40, and n. 224.
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assurance of the bellicosity of the Dutch, Elizabeth feared that the Northern
provinces might be tempted to reach a settlement independently of English me-
diation. Conversely, as Elizabeth’s relations with Brussels grew closer in 1599, the
States General also implored the queen to distrust the overtures of peace from the
Southern Netherlands and Spain, and assured the queen of their own zealous
commitment to war.93
The donation also provoked a ﬁerce propaganda campaign in the United
Provinces, engendering the publication of a mass of cheap tracts, a number of
which were also published in London, in English translation. Generally these
pamphlets urged the need for the States to reject reconciliation with the
archdukes or Madrid, and exhorted the Southern provinces to revolt against this
newly imposed authority.94 Many of the polemical arguments of the Dutch
against the peace and in favour of the war were similar or identical to those
debated by the English after Vervins, especially as they revolved around the
character of Spanish tyranny, the trustworthiness of the Spanish, and the threat of
Spain’s ambition to the liberty of the states of Christendom. Through the indirect
means of translation of Dutch propaganda, crucial arguments about the direction
of foreign policy were further disseminated to Elizabethan readers of these short,
cheap, printed tracts.95
Recent work on ‘popular politics ’ has argued that English news pamphlets,
which were a staple of the book trade by the 1580s and 1590s, played a crucial role
in ‘creating informed critical debate about news, politics and culture ’.96 The
publication of news about domestic politics, however, was occasional, and mainly
limited to oﬃcial or unoﬃcial government publications which justiﬁed Elizabeth’s
actions in extraordinary cases, such as the execution of high-proﬁle traitors, or
her formal decision to enter into the war in 1585.97 Despite ‘caution over domestic
news ’, the war with Spain catalysed a massive increase in the supply of foreign
news, most of which entailed translations of French or Dutch pamphlets, pro-
duced by a regular stable of translators employed by London printers.98 The main
discursive themes that engaged Elizabethan readers of news pamphlets were
continental political and military developments, and England’s engagement with
the theatres of war.
93 Noel de Caron, the Dutch agent at Elizabeth’s court, alternated warnings about the dangers of
Spanish Netherlands with reassurance that the Dutch were sincere in their hostility to accommodation
with the obedient South; Collins, Letters and memorials, II, pp. 170–2; Kermaingant, L’ambassade de France
en Angleterre, pp. 87, 99, 121; Motley, United Netherlands, IV, pp. 594–8.
94 Astrid Stilma, ‘ Justifying war: Dutch translations of Scottish books around 1600’, in Andrew
Hiscock, ed., Mighty Europe 1400–1700: the writing of an early modern continent (New York, NY, 2007),
pp. 58–9; Craig Harline, Pamphlets, printing and political culture in the Dutch Republic (Dordrecht, 1987).
95 The news pamphlets were typically in quarto. One contemporary book inventory valued a news
pamphlet relating to the Low Countries at 1d ; Raymond, Pamphlets and pamphleteering, p. 4.
96 Ibid., pp. 16–17, 26.
97 See James K. Lowers, Mirrors for rebels : a study of polemical literature relating to the Northern Rebellion,
1569 (Berkley, CA, and Los Angeles, CA, 1953).
98 Raymond, Pamphlets and pamphleteering, pp. 100–1.
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Scholars have aﬀorded attention to the 130 or so translations of French
pamphlets that ﬂooded the English book market in the late 1580s and early 1590s,
unfolding the horrors of the French succession crisis.99 Studies of these trans-
lations convincingly argue that the publication of these tracts was orchestrated
with the particular compliance and encouragement of Burghley, in association
with the London printer, John Wolfe.100 Most translations were of polemic by
loyalist supporters of Henry of Navarre, and were exuberantly hostile to the
Catholic League, and the tyranny of their ally, the king of Spain. For an
Elizabethan audience these pamphlets acted as an indirect form of propaganda
for English military support of Navarre and justiﬁcation for the war with Spain.101
Crucially, the anti-League pamphlets also propagated ‘absolutist ’ ideas of
kingship and the necessary obedience of subjects which characterized ideas of
sovereignty expressed by Henry IV’s supporters, in response to the Catholic
League’s theories of radical resistance. Thus Burghley exhibited a degree of am-
bivalence towards the power of print : he encouraged the development of news
culture, but only covertly, and through texts that avoided direct commentary on
English politics. Furthermore, the French news pamphlets presented authoritarian
concepts of political allegiance and obedience to Elizabethan readers and sub-
jects, adding weight to the current scholarly consensus that political culture in
the 1590s was predominantly characterized by the dissemination of ideas of
‘absolute ’, rather than ‘mixed’ monarchy, and the illegitimacy of resistance.102
Scholars have not, however, studied translations of news from the Low
Countries, which oﬀer a very diﬀerent perspective on the political ideas that
would have confronted the readers of Elizabethan news pamphlets.103 The total
number of printed relations of news from the Low Countries is far smaller than
the number of French translations, apparently numbering just over sixty for the
whole of Elizabeth’s reign.104 It is, however, in the late 1590s, when printed
translations of French pamphlets were in decline, that the number of Dutch
publications quickens signiﬁcantly. Over half the total number of Elizabethan
translations of Dutch pamphlets – over thirty – were published between 1597 and
99 Lisa Ferraro Parmelee, Good newes from Fraunce : French anti-League propaganda in Elizabethan England
(New York, NY, 1996), p. 31; also Paul J. Voss, Elizabethan news pamphlets : Shakespeare, Spenser, Marlowe &
the Birth of journalism (Pittsburgh, PA, 2001).
100 From the early 1590s Wolfe began farming out the actual printing of his work to printers such as
John Windet, while Richard Field also published a large number of the French translations. See Denis
B. Woodﬁeld, Surreptitious printing in England, 1550–1640 (New York, NY, 1973), pp. 24–34.
101 Victor Houliston, Catholic resistance in Elizabethan England: Robert Persons’s Jesuit polemic, 1580–1610
(Aldershot, 2007).
102 Parmelee, Good newes from Fraunce, pp. 7–8, 97–117; Guy, ‘Introduction’, in Guy, ed., Reign of
Elizabeth I, pp. 1–19.
103 Voss and Parmelee are solely concerned with the French news pamphlet.
104 Figures taken from my analysis of tracts from A. W. Pollard and G. R. Redgrave, revised by
W. A. Jackson, F. S. Ferguson and K. F. Pantzer, A short-title catalogue of books printed in England, Scotland
and Ireland, and of English books printed abroad, 1475–1640 (3 vols., London, 1976–91) ; and D. C. Collins,
A handlist of newspamphlets, 1590–1610 (London, 1943).
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1603. Once more, most were published by John Wolfe before his death in 1601.
Printers must have produced translations of Dutch materials independently of
Burghley’s particular impetus, though, as the lord treasurer died in August
1598.105 This sharp increase in the number of published translations of material
from the United Provinces notably coincided with the commencement of political
debates at court about the direction of the Spanish war, and the future of
England’s alliance with the Dutch.
Of particular relevance to the peace were translations of printed propaganda
from the United Provinces, mainly published by Wolfe.106 Although these trans-
lations adhered close to the Dutch originals, readers of these tracts would have
been confronted with strong, polemical arguments for the necessity of the war’s
continuation, albeit from the perspective of the United Provinces, and an absolute
conﬁrmation of the resolve of the Dutch to continue to oppose a negotiated peace
with either the archdukes or with Spain.
A true coppie of the transportation of the Lowe Countries, Burgundy and the countie of
Charrolois, entered in the Stationers’ Register on 7 November 1598, was a printed
copy of the actual text of the donation itself, with ancillary documents. The latter
included the formal recognition by the States of the Southern Provinces, which
stipulated that they might ‘ ioyne in communication with those [Estates] of
Holland and Zealand, to make peace’.107 The text of the donation, however, did
not make easy reading for those whose arguments for peace were grounded on
the newly independent sovereignty of the archdukes. The conditions clearly
stated that should the archdukes produce no heirs, or should those heirs break
their oath to uphold Catholicism, the provinces would revert to Spanish rule.108
The text strongly signalled the intention that the marriage of Isabella and Albert
was intended to reunite the ‘rebel ’ and ‘obedient ’ states.109 In an appended letter,
Philip II explained in more revelatory language that the ‘ intent ’ of the donation
was ‘ the reducing of the Low Countries ’ to ‘peace and tranquilitie ’ (my italics).110
In February 1599, Isabella’s aggressive proclamation forbidding trade with the
Northern provinces was printed, followed by the response of the States General,
declaring the goods of the Spanish and their adherents ‘ lawfull prize ’.111 This
publicized the removal of those trading privileges enjoyed by Dutch merchants
105 Other publishers of Dutch pamphlets included Peter Short and Matthew Law.
106 Wolfe made particular use of one translator, H. W., whose identity is unclear.
107 Philip II, king of Spain, trans. H. W., A true coppie of the transportation of the Lowe Countries, Burgundie,
and the countie of Charrolois : done by the king of Spayne, for the dowrie of his eldest daughter. Giuen in marriage vnto the
Cardinall Albert, duke of Austria, vvith the articles and conditions of the same, signed by the king in Madrill (1598),
[p. 27], printed by J. Roberts for Paul Linley. The Dutch title is Copye van het transport … van de
Nederlanden/Bourgoignen/ende Graefschappe van Charrolois, which was printed in several editions in the
Netherlands. I am indebted to Monica Stensland for tracing the originals.
108 Anon., True coppie of the transportation, p. 6. 109 Ibid., p. 8. 110 Ibid., p. 24.
111 Isabella Clara Eugenia, A coppie of the proclamation made by the illustrious Infanta … touching the defence,
interdiction and restraint of all communication, dealing and traﬃcke with Holland, Zeland and their adherents (1599) ;
United Provinces, States General, A proclamation of the lords the General States, of the vnited Prouinces, whereby
the Spaniards and all their goods are declared to be lawfull prize (1599).
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with Spain and the Southern Netherlands, which had been the cause of such
resentment in Anglo-Dutch negotiations the previous summer.112
Other printed translations more directly presented the archdukes as puppets
controlled by Madrid, and the donation as a scheme to reduce the Netherlands to
the Spanish empire. A brilliantly mischievous pamphlet was published in trans-
lation by Wolfe, also in April 1599 : A copie of a certaine letter : written by a person of
reputation, to a prelate of Brabant, being at Brussels was seemingly designed to stiﬀen
the Dutch resistance to the archdukes’ government in both the Northern and
Southern Provinces. Revelling in the use of a false narrator and fake ‘editorial ’
practice typical of late sixteenth-century polemic, this tract purported to be a
letter by a dignitary who had been asked by an unnamed Flemish prelate for his
opinions on the new authority in the Low Countries. The ‘person of reputation’
warned that the donation was a typically deceitful eﬀort by Spain to reconquer
the whole of the Netherlands, ‘which by armes or other meanes can hardly be
done’, and reminded the reader of the untrustworthiness of the words and in-
tentions of Spanish monarchs.113 This ‘ letter ’ was accompanied by a text of the
donation itself, surrounded by new marginalia and glosses which undermined and
reinterpreted the donation, to ‘reveal ’ the dangerous reality behind the translation
of sovereignty. One marginal note argued that the donation itself was an unlawful
usurpation, as it had been decreed in Spain without the assent of the States
General representing the whole of the Netherlands.114 The conditions of the
donation would ensure that ‘ the Princes of the Netherlands, should for euer
remaine subiects to the king of Spaine and the Spanish counsaile ’, enforcing
confessionalization through the ‘Spanish Inquisition’.115 Marginalia reminded
the reader of the brutality of the ‘Duke of Alba, and other his Tyrants ’, who had
attempted to rule the Netherlands as a ‘new conquested land’. If Spanish tyranny
continued to ﬂourish through such underhand means, the consequences for the
rest of Europe were starkly laid bare : ‘ insatiable Spanish ambition’ had as its
greatest aim the subjection of all free polities, ‘ the incorporating and establishing
laws to all Realmes, Countries, and Commonweales ’.116 The ‘dignitary’ ﬁnished
with a call to arms: he explained that his glosses proved that the donation – this
‘conditioned gift ’ – ‘will not prooue the right means to reduce the Netherlands in
rest, peace, & prosperitie ’. Rather, it should encourage all the states of the Low
Countries to ‘ take armes against the Spaniard & his adherents ’ and allow the
people to recover ‘ their rights, freedomes, & securitie ’ enshrined in the free
authority of ‘ the Generall States of all the Netherlands ’.117
112 See above.
113 Anon., A copie of a certaine letter : written by a person of reputation, to a prelate of Brabant, being at Brussels
(1599), sig. A3r. The Dutch original is Copye van seekeren brief cheschreven by een van qualiteyt, aen den abt van N.
wesende tot Bruyssel, published in several editions anonymously.
114 Anon., Copie of a certaine letter, sig. [A4v]. 115 Ibid., sigs. B2v–B3v. 116 Ibid., sig. Br–v.
117 Ibid., sig. [B4r–v].
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As well as informing English readers about the dangerous implications of the
archdukes’ rule for peace in the United Provinces – but Christendom more
generally – these texts revolved around analyses of tyranny. Dutch propaganda
emphasized that peace and reconciliation with Spain was impossible because the
Spanish were deceitful, insatiable warmongers, who sought to repress religious
conscience, as well as the secular privileges, goods, and property of a free estates
and people, and the imperium of other sovereign nations. Reconciliation by the
kinds of mediated peace being proposed was impossible because of the despotic
character of the general adversary of the Dutch and their allies.
Two especially striking tracts printed earlier, in 1598, related this discourse
about war and peace speciﬁcally to arguments about political authority. A true
coppie of the admonitions sent by the subdued provinces to the states of Hollande : and the
Hollanders answere to the same, and The second admonition, sent by the subdued prouinces to
Holland … with the Hollanders aunswere were companion pieces of Dutch propa-
ganda, written directly in response to the prospect of peace in the Netherlands.
The ﬁrst was entered in the Stationers’ Register on 12 July, when Essex was
probably writing his Apologie, and while the States were bargaining with Elizabeth
for the renewal of the Anglo-Dutch alliance. Wolfe entered the second on 28
October, soon after the accession of Philip III.118 Both tracts were constructed on
the same template : an imagined dialogue ventriloquized between the ‘ subdued ’
or ‘obedient ’ provinces and the United Provinces, or ‘Hollanders ’, about the
beneﬁts of making peace with Spain. The structure of the tracts, in which the
‘Subject Provinces ’ argue in favour of the peace, followed by the refutation of
the ‘Hollanders ’, echoed the utramque partem structure of the English manuscript
treatises.119
In both pamphlets the ‘Subdued Provinces ’ urged the United Provinces to
make peace for conventional reasons. War was inimical to Christian religion, and
by perpetuating military strife the rebel states were ‘bent to murther and blood-
shed’.120 The ‘Hollanders ’ replied that tyrants could not be held to promises, and
warned against ‘an accursed peace’, ‘a fained peace which should be hurtfull, or
which might cause losse of lawfull liberty or priuiledges ’.121
The debate, however, extended into a dialogue about tyranny, obedience, and
the legitimacy of resistance. In both tracts, the ventriloquized voice of the
‘Subdued Provinces ’ conﬂated the bellicosity of the United Provinces with the
118 Both were translated by ‘H. W.’ Dutch versions are Copie van seker refereyn by de overheerde
Nederlandtsche Provintien … Met oock der Hollanders antwoorde…, published anonymously, and Antwoordt op
het tweede refereyn, by de overheerde Nederlantsche Provintien aen Hollant gheschreven … te bewegen, vrede te maken met
den Spangiaert, published by Laurens Jacobsz in Amsterdam. An edition of the ﬁrst text was also pub-
lished in Edinburgh by Robert Waldegrave, also in 1598.
119 The English version of the Coppie of the admonitions also replicates (with translated inscriptions) the
frontispiece engraving from the Dutch version.
120 Anon., trans. H. W. The second admonition, sent by the subdued prouinces to Holland, thereby to entice them
by faire-seeming reasons, groundlesse threates, and vnlike examples to make peace with the Spaniards : with the Hollanders
aunswere to the same (1598), p. 7. 121 Ibid., p. 12.
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sin of disobedience. The ‘Hollanders ’ had rejected ‘ the Prince whome God and
nature hath giuen thee ’.122 ‘There were neuer yet found rebels, which in their
faults were not confuted and ouerthrowen. ’123
The voice of the United Provinces refuted all of these allegations in an even
more robust and self-righteous rhetoric. It was not the rebel states that were guilty
of bloodlust, but Philip of Spain, who, ‘what with hanging, strangling, murther-
ing, and burning, destroyeth (in a manner) all the worlde ’.124 The ‘Hollanders ’
deﬁned their struggle as a just and lawful war: ‘In the defence of our libertie and
securitie … we are altogether zealously bent … An honourable death is to bee preferred
before a slauish life. ’125
The voice of the ‘Hollanders ’ in the Second admonition pursued the defence of
‘ liberty ’ in some detail, extending into a general treatment of the nature of
monarchy – deﬁned as contractual and elective – and of the legitimacy of resist-
ance and deposition. The pamphlet asserted that princes were bound by the
conditions of their coronation oaths : ‘ the people choose a Prince : but he sweares
at his crowning, to be unto them, their lawes and liberties an eternall defendor,
and to maintaine them and augment them with all his might ’.126 The abrogation
of these oaths reduced their people to slavery, as proved with speciﬁc reference to
the conditions and privileges that were particular to the Spanish king’s sover-
eignty of the Netherlands and in Aragon.127 The discussion of subjects’ rights to
resist tyranny, however, was expanded into a general rule, a divine law, or law of
nature, which was illustrated by reference to both Scripture and history. The
examples of Shadrach, Mischach, and Abednego, Daniel and Matthias were
invoked to argue that ‘Against tyranny all God-fearing people may ﬁght. ’ This
rule was also proved by ‘ the example of many nations ’ ; the deposition of Louis II
of France, or Caligula, ‘murthered by the Romans’, and a famous English case :
Edward II of England, who had been ruled by ‘bad counsaile ’ and deposed by
‘Peares of the land moued by [his] Cruelty ’. The depositions of these kings had
been achieved by human agents who acted in accordance with divine providence :
‘No Tyrant that euer could escape Gods punishment. ’128
This argument completely undermined Bilson’s constitutional relativism: his
theory that resistance was legitimate in ‘elective ’ but not in ‘absolute ’ mon-
archies. History proved that actions justiﬁed in the Low Countries were theore-
tically applicable in any monarchy, including England. These ideas were hardly
groundbreaking, and were common to late sixteenth-century resistance theory, as
articulated by Scottish and continental writers. What was remarkable about this
particular exposition of these arguments was their appearance in print and in the
122 Anon., trans. H. W., A true coppie of the admonitions sent by the subdued provinces to the states of Hollande :
and the Hollanders answere to the same. Together vvith the articles of peace concluded betweene the high and mightie
princes, Phillip by the grace of God King of Spaine, &c. and Henry the Fourth by the same grace, the most Christian King
of France (1598), unpaginated. 123 Anon., Second admonition, p. 8. 124 Ibid., p. 11.
125 Ibid., p. 13. 126 Ibid., p. 25. 127 Ibid., p. 26.
128 Ibid., pp. 27–8.
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English vernacular. The content of these pamphlets from the Netherlands also
contrasted markedly with the political ideas contained in translations of French
pamphlets studied by Parmelee, which articulated ideas of absolute kingship and
the illegitimacy of resistance.
These materials presented arguments against peace with Spain grounded in
the impossibility of accommodation with untrustworthy enemies, and the con-
tinued threat of Spanish tyranny to the liberty of free states : essentially the nub
of Essex’s ideological hostility to peace, and of the authors of like-minded
manuscript treatises. In the printed realm, there did not appear to exist a set of
similar texts which countered the message of the enthusiasts for war, sympathetic
to the paciﬁc intentions of Spain or the archdukes. Only bellicose and hispano-
phobic arguments against peace were represented in late Elizabethan news
pamphlets.
The question that begs and eludes an easy answer is the motivation that lay
behind the publication of these translations. Market and proﬁtability would have
been the primary consideration of any London printer, especially one as com-
mercially aware as Wolfe. Publishers presumably calculated that the immediate
context of the peace negotiations would attract the interest of a book-buying
public, who paid subsidies, or felt the repercussions of the war for English trade.
The French translations would have provided Wolfe and other printers with a
substantial part of their income in the earlier part of the decade. After the decline
of Burghley’s patronage and death, it might have seemed opportune to restore
that income with zesty pamphlets from the Netherlands.129
Further research also remains to be carried out into the passage of books
between the Low Countries and England. Parmelee admits that it is exceptionally
diﬃcult to trace the journey of texts from the continent to English presses, but
that merchants, travellers, and especially diplomats were regular conduits for the
passage of books across the channel.130 English diplomats were certainly aware of
the signiﬁcance of the propaganda war that was stimulated by the peace de-
bates.131 When Essex was writing his Apologie, he borrowed Dutch pamphlets from
Thomas Bodley that the latter had amassed during his sojourn as Elizabeth’s
ambassador with the States General between 1588 and 1597.132 It is also possible
that the States General might have attempted to manipulate the popular press or
‘public opinion’ in England in their delicate attempts to prevent Elizabeth from
reaching a settlement with Spain. This would have been a risky strategy, at least
as likely to anger the queen as to put pressure on her to maintain the Anglo-Dutch
alliance. The publication of the English translation of the Coppie of the admonitions
in Edinburgh in 1598 dismayed recently arrived representatives of the United
Provinces at the Scottish court, because it had reached James VI’s attention, who
129 Parmelee, Good newes from Fraunce, p. 33. 130 Ibid., pp. 35–7.
131 In May 1598 George Gilpin wrote to Essex from The Hague about the disruptive pamphle-
teering in favour of peace or war that followed the publication of the Treaty of Vervins;HMC Salisbury,
VIII, pp. 178–9. 132 Birch, Negotiations, pp. 170–2.
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strongly objected to the radical content of the pamphlet’s discussion of princely
authority and obedience.133
It seems most likely that the initiative behind translations of Dutch propaganda
lay with the publishers rather than with members of the Dutch or the Elizabethan
regimes. Wolfe especially had extensive contacts with printers and booksellers in
the United Provinces.134 Was the publication of these texts, however, somehow
connected to the court? Were Essex and his wider circle involved, as William
Cecil had been in the French translations? The earl’s associates ‘ scribally pub-
lished’ texts in manuscript which articulated his political position. But Essex’s
circle also planned covert print publications : in 1596 the queen suppressed plans
of Essex and his secretariat to publish a version of the Cadiz voyage, while Essex’s
circle prepared an English translation of Antonio Pe´rez’s Pedac¸os de historia oˆ
relaciones in 1594–5, for a print run which never materialized.135
It seems most likely, though, that Wolfe recognized that these Dutch tracts
contained a compelling reﬂection on contemporary events which made them
likely to sell, especially as they echoed Essex’s views on the war. Wolfe may
also have sought out the earl as a patron after Burghley’s death. He was certainly
responsible for publishing John Haywood’s infamous Life and raigne of King
Henrie IIII in February 1599, which caused great controversy on account of per-
ceived parallels drawn between the misgovernment of Richard II and Elizabeth,
but especially because the history was dedicated to Essex. The dedication had
been included at Wolfe’s suggestion, and he made at least three journeys to the
court to ascertain Essex’s response immediately after the book’s appearance in
print.136
V
Irrespective of ‘elite ’ encouragement, these sensationalist news pamphlets
engaged their audiences with impassioned arguments about the direction of
foreign policy that were usually carried out in more rariﬁed political space and
media, in the interaction of diplomats, or in conciliar debates. The manuscript
treatises represent an intersection between the personal exchanges of statesmen,
diplomats, and courtiers, and the more public medium of print.
The published translations underscore again the indirect ways that readers of
print were exposed to the substance of politics and political ideas in the form of
foreign news, before the development of domestic news culture during the English
Civil Wars. In the last years of Elizabeth’s reign, wariness about the subversive
properties of print intensiﬁed, as did attitudes to coded political allusion
133 Stilma, ‘Justifying war’, p. 62.
134 Personal communication from Dr Stilma.
135 Hammer, ‘Propaganda and the capture of Cadiz ’ ; Gajda, ‘State of Christendom ’, pp. 427–8.
136 Essex waited until consternation about the book became evident before requesting Whitgift to
investigate the text ; John Manning, ed., The ﬁrst and second parts of John Hayward’s The life and raigne of King
Henrie IIII, Camden Fourth Series, 42 (London, 1991), pp. 18–19.
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in literature. In June 1599, Archbishop Whitgift and Bishop Bancroft issued the
so-called ‘Bishops’ Ban’, which prohibited the publication of satires, epigrams,
histories, and plays without the prior approval of regulatory authorities.137 No
mention, however, was made of the publication of foreign news pamphlets,
despite their clear topicality, and the markedly non-authoritarian political ideas
contained in some translations of Dutch tracts. Nor was there anything clan-
destine about Wolfe’s Dutch translations, most of which were entered in the
Stationers’ Register. Accordingly, the most radical political theory endorsed in a
printed text in England in 1598–9 was not to be found in the satires of John
Marston or Thomas Middleton, in John Davies’s epigrams, or other censored
tracts, but was buried in the Second admonition, which was not an ostensible com-
mentary on English politics.138
The wider importance of this multi-layered debate about war and peace lies in
its contribution to our understanding of the relationship between foreign policy
and political discourse in Elizabethan and early Stuart England. Quentin Skinner
has argued that translations of Roman history during this period encouraged
English readers to develop an acute sensitivity to the repression of liberty and the
operation of tyranny, which shaped ideological divisions before the 1640s.139
Debates about peace in the late 1590s, however, reveal that ideas of tyranny and
slavery, liberty and privilege, obedience and resistance, absolute and contractual
monarchy were also articulated in contemporary arguments about the war with
Spain and the conceptualization of the Dutch revolt.
The manuscript treatises, which disclose diﬀerent attitudes to the government
of the United Provinces and the abjuration of the sovereignty of Philip II, supply
a sense of future ideological divisions. The pro-war tracts reveal a mindset
orientated above all towards opposition to tyranny, albeit Spanish tyranny, and
the tendency to view the threat to political and religious liberties on the continent
as a common danger to all Protestant states. The pro-peace treatises reveal a
conservative abhorrence of ‘popular ’ government and the disruption of social
hierarchy, as well as the impulse to read confessional divisions as just one of a
series of factors that aﬀected the direction of foreign policy. It is signiﬁcant in light
of his developing attitude to Elizabeth that the bellicose mentality of Essex en-
compassed the former propensity to dwell on the threat of tyranny. It is even
more signiﬁcant that the future king would side ﬁrmly with the peacemongers.
Malcolm Smuts has shown that James’s perception of himself as rex paciﬁcus
developed in relation to his theories of monarchical authority. In 1603, the
137 Clegg, Press censorship, pp. 198–217.
138 The tract had even been licensed by Abraham Hartwell, a secretary of Whitgift ; E. Arber,
A transcript of the registers of the Company of Stationers of London, 1554–1640 AD (5 vols., London, 1875–94), III,
p. 43.
139 Quentin Skinner, ‘Classical liberty, renaissance translation and the English Civil War’, in Visions
of Politics, II : Renaissance virtues (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 308–43.
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new king would denounce the ‘rebellious ’ provinces in table-talk about subjects’
duty of obedience to princes.140 The long legacy of these Elizabethan debates
about war and peace would bear fruit in the 1620s, when response to England’s
engagement in the Thirty Years War would form a ﬁzzing backdrop to the
troubles of the Stuart monarchs.
140 Malcolm Smuts, ‘The making of rex paciﬁcus :. James VI and I and the problem of peace in an age
of religious war’, in Daniel Fisclin and Mark Fortier, eds., Royal subjects : essays on the writings of James VI
and I (Detroit, IL, 2002), p. 378.
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